FLP Loss, but Crummey Win by Gerzog, Wendy G.
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
11-28-2011
FLP Loss, but Crummey Win
Wendy G. Gerzog
University of Baltimore School of Law, wgerzog@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, Taxation-Federal Estate
and Gift Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
FLP Loss, but Crummey Win, 133 Tax Notes 1139 (November 28, 2011)
FLP Loss, but Crummey Win
By Wendy C. Gerzog
In Turner,1 the Tax Court addressed two issues.
The primary question was whether the value of the
underlying assets in the decedent’s family limited
partnership was included in his estate under section
2035, 2036, or 2038. The secondary issue was
whether the decedent made additional taxable gifts
or whether his insurance payments qualified for
annual exclusions under Crummey.2 The estate lost
on the FLP question but won on the Crummey issue.
Clyde Turner Sr. died on February 4, 2004, and
was survived by his widow, Jewell, and three of
their four children: Clyde Jr., Betty, and Janna.3 A
third daughter, Joyce, died in 1993. One of Joyce’s
sons, Rory, had been arrested multiple times for
illegal drug offences; however, Rory had a close
relationship with his grandmother, Jewell.4
The decedent and Jewell held more than 170,000
shares of Regions Bank stock, and because of a
family relationship with the bank, they sold few of
its shares.5 Although the decedent at times traded
other stock holdings, he had no special investment
strategy.6 The decedent established an irrevocable
trust to hold life insurance policies for the benefit of
12 beneficiaries: his then-living children and grand-
children. The trust itself did not pay the insurance
premiums; rather, the decedent paid the premiums
with checks from his joint checking account with
Jewell.7 According to the trust agreement, each
beneficiary had the right to withdraw the lesser of
$10,000 (or $20,000, if married) minus any amounts
earlier transferred during the year, or the amount of
the transfer divided by the number of beneficiaries.
The beneficiary was required to give notice of his
desire to exercise his withdrawal right within 30
days of the decedent’s direct or indirect transfer to
the trust. The court found no evidence that any
anyone requested a withdrawal before the de-
cedent’s death.8
Marc, Clyde Jr.’s son, had assisted his grandpar-
ents in their financial affairs and with their book-
keeping. They called Marc to discuss pooling their
assets to manage them. Marc and his brother,
Travis, contacted an attorney at a law firm their
grandparents had previously used, and the attorney
contacted the decedent and Jewell about establish-
ing an FLP and contributing assets to that entity. At
that time, the decedent was in his early 80s, and
Jewell in her late 70s, and both were healthy.9
Approximately two years before his death, the
decedent and Jewell formed their FLP, with each of
them owning a 0.5 percent general partnership
interest and a 49.5 percent limited partnership in-
terest. There was no objective evidence of any
partnership meetings before the decedent’s death,
although there were two meetings afterward, once
in 2004 and once in 2005, to discuss the FLP’s ‘‘past
performance and investment plans’’ as well as the
decedent’s estate and his will.10
In 2002 the decedent and Jewell each contributed
half of the total $8,667,342 FLP contributions, con-
sisting of liquid assets (cash, certificates of deposit
(CDs), marketable securities, bonds, and annuities).
They received proportionate FLP interests in ex-
change for their contributions, and the assets were
1Estate of Turner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-209, Doc
2011-18498, 2011 TNT 169-7.
2Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
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retitled in the FLP’s name.11 The couple also re-
tained more than $2 million in assets that produced
sufficient income to pay their living expenses.12
The stated general purposes of the FLP were: ‘‘(1)
To make a profit, (2) to increase the family’s wealth,
and (3) to provide a means whereby family mem-
bers can become more knowledgeable about the
management and preservation of the family’s as-
sets.’’13 The FLP agreement also stated nine specific
purposes for formation; however, the list was based
on the law firm’s standard form. ‘‘Consequently,
some of the purposes listed in the partnership
agreement did not apply to the Turner family, and
Clyde Sr. and Jewell’s actual purposes for establish-
ing Turner and Co. were not necessarily reflected in
the partnership agreement,’’ the court said.14
The partnership agreement provided that the
general partner ‘‘shall be the sole manager of the
Partnership and have sole authority in the conduct
and management of the business of the Partner-
ship.’’15 According to the agreement, the general
partner would keep the books and records, and
distribute reports to the limited partners. The gen-
eral partner would pay all the partnership’s oper-
ating costs and for that, he would receive ‘‘a special
allocation of income in an amount to be determined
in good faith by the general partner’’ as well as a
reasonable management fee.16 Despite that provi-
sion, the decedent and Jewell opted to receive a
$2,000-per-month management fee that the FLP
treated as a nondeductible distribution instead of a
deductible expense.17
Also, the agreement provided that the partner-
ship’s net cash flow be distributed to each partner,
limited and general, relative to each one’s income
tax liability resulting from the FLP’s income, and
that any excess income be distributed ‘‘at such times
and in such amounts as determined by the General
Partner in its sole and absolute discretion.’’18 The
general partner controlled in-kind distributions and
was entitled to dissolve the FLP after selling its
assets.19 Likewise, the agreement provided that the
general partner could amend the agreement ‘‘at any
time without the consent or approval of the limited
partners.’’20
An amendment to the partnership agreement
provided that on the later of the decedent’s or
Jewell’s death, their three children would become
the FLP’s general partners. Those three general
partners, together with Trey (Joyce’s son and Rory’s
brother) and the Habersham Bank, which was the
trustee of Rory’s trust,21 could require that the FLP
undergo a tax-free reorganization to create five
separate partnerships, which would receive a pro
rata share of liquid and illiquid assets after the latter
were sold.22
The general partners signed a management fee
agreement with their grandsons, Marc and Travis,
to pay them a monthly fee of $500 for their daily
management services as defined by the general
partner.23 The FLP paid them each $2,500 in 2002,
$5,500 in 2003, and $7,000 in 2004. In 2003 and 2004
the decedent classified those payments as gifts. The
partnership neither took deductions for those pay-
ments nor issued any tax forms indicating that
those amounts were taxable income, and neither
Marc nor Travis included them in their 2002-2004
federal income tax returns.24 The FLP investment
accounts showed either no change in investments
or a few purchases and sales of stocks, notes, and
money market funds. Because the decedent had a
sentimental attachment to Regions Bank stock, he
refused to sell any of those shares. The FLP also
participated in a few real estate purchases and
sales.25
The FLP paid legal fees, some of which related to
estate planning for the decedent and Jewell. The
decedent paid an FLP bank debt from his personal
checking account. More than a year later, the ac-
countant entered that transaction as a partnership
debt to the decedent.26 In 2002 the FLP paid the
decedent $41,500 but made no payments to Jewell
or to any limited partner. However, the FLP’s tax
return indicated distributions of $235 to each gen-
eral partner and distributions to the decedent and
Jewell as limited partners, respectively, of $23,277
and $23,276, presumably including the $5,000 fee
paid to Marc and Travis.27 In 2003 the FLP distrib-











21Because of Rory’s drug and legal problems, a trust had






27Id. at 24. The court assumed that it included $5,500 paid to
Marc and Travis, but the 2002 payments were $2,500 paid to
each of them, which were treated as distributions to the
decedent and Jewell although the court stated that the numbers
were wrong because there was no explanation for a $23 discrep-
ancy. Id. at 24, n.16.
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$46,170 of which was paid to the decedent to cover
his estimated federal and state income taxes associ-
ated with FLP income to them, and $13,645 was to
pay premiums on the insurance policy on the
decedent’s life, which benefited the decedent’s chil-
dren and grandchildren.28 In 2004 the FLP made
payments of $5,312, $911, and $12,267 to cover
Rory’s, Janna’s, and Betty’s tax liabilities. The FLP
also paid $58,000 to Jewell to purchase an automo-
bile.29
On December 31, 2002, and on January 1, 2003,
the decedent and Jewell made gifts of partnership
interests, respectively valued at $1,652,315 and
$474,315, to their three living children and to their
deceased daughter’s children.30 On October 13,
2004, after the decedent’s death, the executor of his
estate filed gift tax returns for those gifts.31
The Tax Court first addressed the section 2036
issue.32 It said that the purpose of that statute was to
include the date of death value of inter vivos trans-
fers that were intrinsically testamentary, in that the
transferor retained a significant interest in or con-
trol over the transferred property.33 The court held
that the decedent made an inter vivos transfer when
he transferred his assets to his FLP in exchange for
general and limited partnership interests.34
Moreover, the court held that the transfer did not
fall within the bona fide sale exception, which,
under the Bongard35 test requires that there was a
‘‘legitimate and significant nontax reason for crea-
tion of the family limited partnership and the
transferors received partnership interests propor-
tionate to the value of the property transferred.’’36
Whether there was a bona fide sale focuses on the
taxpayer’s motive. The reasons enumerated in the
partnership agreement reflected those in the attor-
ney’s form agreement and did not necessarily con-
stitute the decedent’s and Jewell’s intentions or
goals. The estate argued that at a minimum, the
couple wanted to ‘‘consolidate their assets for man-
agement purposes, to facilitate resolution of family
disputes through equal sharing of information,’’
and to provide protection to and from Rory, but the
court found that the record did not support that
those reasons constituted ‘‘a legitimate and signifi-
cant reason’’ motivating the FLP formation.37
The court held that the creation of the FLP merely
involved changing the form of asset management.
First, the assets in the FLP did not necessitate
‘‘active management or special protection.’’38 The
couple owned passive, marketable investments,
and they did not have ‘‘a coherent investment
plan.’’39 The estate contended that the decedent and
Jewell had contributed liquid assets to the FLP to
start up a real estate business, a new investment
strategy. The court, however, found that the FLP’s
sporadic and minor real estate activity was similar
to the decedent’s pre-FLP real estate investment
activities.40 Also, there was no significant change in
the decedent’s investment portfolio. The estate’s
argument that opening and closing CDs represents
active investing was unpersuasive because CDs are
cash equivalents. Likewise, there was no real
change in investment management, because Marc
performed virtually identical management func-
tions for the decedent before the FLP’s creation.41
The FLP did not ‘‘meaningfully consolidate [dece-
dent’s] and Jewell’s assets or implement an active
and formal investment strategy.’’42
The court found no credible evidence that the
FLP was created to resolve family disputes.43 Their
family issues were not matters of financial disagree-
ments, but rested on personality conflicts between
Clyde Jr. and his sisters and their spouses. The court
considered this purported FLP rationale to be ‘‘an
after-the-fact, hypothetical justification’’ for the
FLP’s formation.44 Similarly, the court was not
persuaded that asset protection to and from Rory
was a significant nontax motive for FLP creation.
Jewell’s gifts to him were purely voluntary, and she
neither wanted nor required protection from him.
Also, the decedent and Jewell retained $2 million in
assets, and there was no evidence that those funds
were in any danger from Rory.45 Finally, Rory had
no assets of his own to protect.46
The court further underscored the ways in which
the decedent’s transfers were not bona fide sales:
The decedent stood on all sides of the transaction at





32The taxpayer had argued that section 7491(a) shifted the
burden of proof to the government, but the court explained that
its decision was not based on burden of proof but on the
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 30.
33Id. at 31-32.
34Id. at 32.
35Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 95 (2005), Doc
2005-5359, 2005 TNT 50-11.
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with FLP funds (for example, gifts to his grandchil-
dren, life insurance premium payments, estate
planning legal fee payments); and there was an
eight-month delay in transferring assets to the
partnership.47 Therefore, although the parties stipu-
lated that the decedent and Jewell received propor-
tionate partnership interests in exchange for their
asset transfers, the court held that the bona fide
sales exception of section 2036 did not apply.48
The court enumerated factors showing that the
decedent retained an interest in the FLP assets,
which required including the transferred assets in
his gross estate under section 2036(a)(1): ‘‘a transfer
of most of the decedent’s assets, continued use of
the transferred property, commingling of personal
and partnership assets, disproportionate distribu-
tions to the transferor, use of entity funds for
personal expenses, and the testamentary character-
istics of the arrangement.’’49 The decedent and/or
Jewell received $2,000 as a fixed management fee
without regard to their duties and without evidence
that they performed any management duties for the
FLP.50 Also, the decedent’s use of FLP funds for his
gift giving, his payment of his own life insurance
policy premiums and his personal attorney fees, his
personal payment of an FLP debt, his personal
purchase of property for the FLP, and his receipt of
disproportionate FLP distributions all indicated a
retained interest in the partnership assets.51 The
court stressed the testamentary character of the
decedent’s FLP creation in the context of his con-
tacting and meeting with the attorneys to do his
estate planning.52 ‘‘We are particularly struck by the
implausibility of petitioner’s assertion that tax sav-
ings from the family limited partnership were never
discussed during a meeting focusing in part on
estate planning. We do not find testimony to that
effect to be credible, and that lack of credibility
infects all of the testimony petitioner offered’’ about
the decedent’s intended purposes of FLP formation,
the court wrote.53
The court held that section 2036(a)(2) also ap-
plied. The decedent was a general partner and
could amend the partnership return at any time
without the limited partners’ consent. Even after his
family gifts of FLP interests, the decedent and
Jewell owned more than 50 percent of the FLP
interests; they therefore also controlled all partner-
ship decisions requiring a majority of limited part-
ners’ consent.54
On whether there were additional taxable gifts
because the decedent and Jewell claimed annual
exclusions for indirect amounts transferred to the
insurance trust that contained Crummey demand
rights, the court held for the estate. According to
Cristofani,55 which cited Crummey, ‘‘The test is not
whether the beneficiary was likely to receive the
present enjoyment of the property, but whether he
or she had the legal right to demand it.’’56 The court
said that in Crummey the taxpayers’ trust agreement
provided that following a direct or indirect transfer
of property to the trust, each beneficiary had a right
to demand cash from the trust and that if a benefi-
ciary was a minor, a guardian could make that
demand on the minor’s behalf. It was immaterial
that any minor beneficiary would actually make
that demand, and the Ninth Circuit in Crummey
acknowledged that some beneficiaries likely did not
even know that they had that demand right. Yet, the
court allowed annual exclusions for those gifts.57
In Turner, the decedent made gifts to his children
and grandchildren in trust when he paid the insur-
ance premiums. However, the government main-
tained that the beneficiaries’ withdrawal rights
were illusory because the decedent made direct
payments of the insurance premiums and because
the beneficiaries never received notice of the trans-
fers, which in turn deprived them of their opportu-
nity to make a demand. The court held that the fact
that the decedent did not transfer money directly to
the trust or that the beneficiaries may not have
known about their withdrawal rights was irrel-
evant.
Likewise, the court found in favor of the tax-
payers regarding the government’s alternative ar-
gument that the transfers of limited partnership
interests in 2002 and 2003 already exhausted some
of the beneficiaries’ annual exclusion. The court
said that since the date of death value of the assets
the decedent transferred to the FLP was included in
the decedent’s estate, his gifts of partnership inter-
ests reported on his estate tax return must be





50Id. at 48. Further, the decedent could amend the partner-






55Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991).
56Turner, citing Cristofani, T.C. Memo. 2011-209, at 53.
57Id. at 55-56.
58Id. at 56-58.
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Analysis and Conclusion
The court’s discussion of, and holding on, the
application of section 2036 to the decedent’s trans-
fers of assets to his FLP and his retained interests
and powers is very clear and thorough. On the
second issue of Crummey and the annual exclusion,
the court seemed to expand prior case law on the
annual exclusion. First, the court effectively held
that there was no need for the beneficiaries to
receive Crummey letters, but, more significantly, the
court included indirect gifts to a trust as also
qualifying for the annual exclusion under Crummey.
Citing Crummey and Cristofani, the court held:
‘‘Likewise, the fact that some or even all of the
beneficiaries may not have known they had the
right to demand withdrawals from the trust does
not affect their legal right to do so.’’59
On one hand, eliminating the need for Crummey
letters might give practitioners a sigh of relief.
Explaining the need for the letters and, at the same
time, the reasons the beneficiaries should not exer-
cise their demand rights, must confirm clients’
beliefs that all lawyers are crazy. On the other hand,
there’s a further illogic in extending Crummey to
indirect gifts because those gifts are not actual
transfers of any funds into the trust, so that makes
the exercise of any demand rights created by and
existing in the trust a virtual impossibility. Both
Crummey and Cristofani involved actual, direct
transfers to a trust; there at least was a fund from
which the beneficiaries could demand withdrawals.
59Turner, T.C. Memo. 2011-209, at 57.
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